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Feminist Legal Academics: Changing the Epistemology of American
Law Through Conflicts, Controversies and Comparisons
CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW 1
(to be published in Gender and Careers in the Legal Academy,
Ulrike Schultz, editor, Hart Publishing-Onati Series, forthcoming)

I. Introduction: Generations of Women Law Professors Making New Legal Memes
There are many ways that the story of women’s entrance to the American law

professoriate can be told. It is important to note the numbers of first women at

various stages of legal history, years of first entry, first tenured professors, first
deans and administrators, 2 and other important demographic milestones. 3 It is

Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, University of California, Irvine
and A.B. Chettle Jr. Professor of Law, Dispute Resolution and Conflict Resolution,
Emerita, Georgetown University.
Thanks to Ulrike Schultz and the other participants at the 2016 Conference on
Gender and Careers in the Legal Academy Conference in Oberwesel, Germany for
stimulating conversation, papers, comments, feedback and extraordinary feminist
scholarship and company. Thanks to my colleagues Kaaryn Gustafson, Dan Burk,
Jennifer Chacon and Michele Goodwin for comments, bibliographic, and substantive
updates on newer generations in this work. And thanks to my research assistant, of
the newest generation, Christine Fan, for comments, edits and reference checking. I
also thank Georgetown University Law Center and UCLA School of Law, which were
the supportive crucibles, with so many wonderful feminist colleagues, of my own
feminist work as a second-generation feminist legal academic. And to my husband,
Robert Meadow, who is the most amazing feminist I know (and who is not a lawyer,
though a former academic himself!).
2 Herma Kay, ‘Women Law School Deans: A Different Breed or Just One of the Boys?’
(2002) 14 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 219.
3 Herma Kay, “What I Learned About Feminism From the Early Women Law
Professors,’ 9 Issues in Legal Scholarship 2 (2011); Herma Kay, The First Few and
Those Who Followed: Women Law Professors in the United States During the
Twentieth Century (forthcoming); Herma Kay, ‘The Future of Women Law
Professors,’ (1991) 77 Iowa Law Review 5; Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Women in Law,
Ch. 12 (New York: Basic Books, 1981); Donna Fossum “Law Professors: A Profile of
the Teaching Branch of the Profession,’ 1980 American Bar Foundation Research
Journal 501; D. Kelly Weisberg, (1979) ‘Women in Law School Teaching: Problems
and Progress, 30 Journal of Legal Education 229; Marina Angel, “Women in Legal
1
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important to describe and account for the location of women law professors in the
much stratified profession of law teaching in the United States, 4 from “doctrinal”

research producing full professors to clinical professors, lawyering skills (legal

writing) professors, adjuncts and academic counselors and administrators. 5 It is

Education,” (2012) 80 University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review 711; Ann
McGinley, ‘Reproducing Gender on Law Faculties,’ (2009) Brigham Young University
Law Review 99; Nancy Levit, ‘Keeping Feminism in Its Place: Sex Segregation and
the Domestication of Female Academics,’ (2001), 49 University of Kansas Law
Review 775; Meera Deo, ‘Looking Forward to Diversity in Legal Academia,’ (2014),
29 Berkeley Journal of Gender Law and Justice 352. For a more conservative and
male-oriented history of the American legal professoriate see Stephen B. Presser,
Law Professors: Three Centuries of Shaping American Law (St. Paul, Minn.: West
Publishing Co. 2017).
4 Herma Kay’s important work, ibid, focuses exclusively on women law professors,
beginning with Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong (1919, Berkeley), who were
appointed to tenure track positions at the American Bar Association/Association of
American Law Schools formally recognized schools, without paying much attention
to the early women practitioners who educated other women in the late 1880s and
early 1890s, either in law office settings (where many men were still learning their
trade) or in unaccredited schools. Notably, two women founded a law school just for
women (Washington College of Law-now American University College of Law- in
Washington DC in 1898), fueling a debate about whether lawyers (like doctors)
should learn law separately from men or not. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The
Feminization of the Legal Profession: The Comparative Sociology of Women in the
Legal Profession,’ in R. Abel and P. Lewis, (eds.) Lawyers and Society Vol. III
Comparative Theories (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989); Karen Berger
Morello, The Invisible Bar: The Woman Lawyer in America: 1638 to the Present
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1986); Virginia G. Drachman, Sisters in Law: Women Lawyers
in Modern American History (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998);
Virginia G. Drachman, Women Lawyers and the Origins of Professional Identity in
America (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press 1993); see also Regina Markell
Morantz-Sanchez, Sympathy and Science: Women Physicians in American Medicine
(New York: Oxford University Press 1985); Penina Migdal Glazer and Miriam Silver,
Unequal Colleagues: The Entrance of Women into the Professions (New Brunswick,
New Jersey: Rutgers University Press 1987). In fact, many of the first women
teaching law did so from practice or in non-professorial capacities so statistics on
the first women law teachers are difficult to compute and different from the first
women who were formally recognized as “legal academics” when more
conventional or elitist standards are used as the measure.
5 See Marina Angel, “Women Lawyers of All Colors Steered to Contingent Positions
in Law Schools and Law Firms,” (2006), 26 UCLA Chicano/a Latino/a Law Review
169; Marina Angel, “The Class Ceiling for Women in Legal Education: Contract
Positions and the Death of Tenure,” (2000) 50 Journal of Legal Education 1.
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instructive to compare women law professors with women’s entrance into other

professional and academic fields (medicine, science, 6 literature, social science, etc.).
I leave these topics for others to pursue. Our standard story is one of growing

numbers, continued stratification, but also increased diversification (race, ethnicity,
if not class and political affiliation 7) and now multiple generations of women law

professors contributing to a vastly transformed understanding of what it means to
study, research, define, interpret and teach legal concepts (and practice them) in
American (post-graduate/professional certification) legal education. 8

In this Chapter I will describe the inter-generational contributions of the first

few decades of women law professors who have created a contested “canon” of new
understandings of legal concepts in American jurisprudence and legal practice. 9 I

describe here the way in which several generations of women law professors (some

See recent obituary of the first woman tenured professor at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Mildred Dresselhaus, The Queen of Carbon Dies at 86,
Natalie Angier, New York Times, February 23, 2017.
7 American Bar Association, Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar,
ABA Approved Law School Staff and Faculty Members, Gender & Ethnicity, Fall 2013,
available at
http://www,americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics.html.;
James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity: Law Faculties in 1997 and 2013 (2015)
(Northwestern Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 15-07, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=25816575; Richard Chused, ‘The Hiring and Retention of
Minorities and Women on American Law School Faculties,’ (1988) 137 U. Penn. Law
Review 537; Deborah Jones Merritt and Barbara F. Reskin, ‘Sex, Race and
Credentials: The Truth about Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring,’ (1997) 97
Columbia Law Review 199.
8 The American Association of Law Schools Section on Women in Legal Education is
currently completing a project of oral histories of several generations of women law
professors, starting with Chairs of the Section since its founding, and law professors
who have led theory development, course instruction and leading litigation
strategies and cases.
9 As evidence of this considerable canon of work, it is essential to consult two of the
first great compilations of feminist legal theory and writing about the law: F.C. De
Coste, K.M. Munro and Lillian MacPherson, Feminist Legal Literature: A Selective
Annotated Bibliography (New York: Garland Publishing 1991) and Betty Taylor,
Sharon Rush and Robert J. Munro, Feminist Jurisprudence, Women and the Law,
Critical Essays, Research Agenda and Bibliography (Littleton, Colorado: Rothman &
Co. 1999).
6
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working with legal practitioners) have forged new legal ideas or “memes” (cultural
units of understandings 10), and legal causes of action that have reframed not only
“women’s issues” (reproductive rights, employment and labor rights, family law,

violence, rape and criminal law, as well as constitutional jurisprudence and

different conceptions of “equality”), but have also contributed new conceptions or

interpretations of mainstream legal concepts (e.g. in contracts, property, and torts
etc. 11 ).

Those of us who have written about these developments over the years all

acknowledge the inter-generational differences in meanings attributed to our goals

as participants in the making of new legal epistemology 12—the interpretation of law
Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976) Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A “meme” (the concept derived from evolutionary biology and “gene”, as a unit of
transmission of genetic material) is now described and used in cultural terms to
mark an “idea, concept, behavior, style, or practice” (now even picture, symbol, logo
or internet phrase) that is transmitted within a culture to describe phenomena in a
compressed and influential sphere of influence. “Memes” are now also applied to
intellectual ideas and concepts, not only in the sciences, but also in all spheres of
learning, including law, as scholars hope to “create” significant new ideas and then
track their influence in creating new knowledge, as well as mapping their influence,
transformation, acceptance or rejection. I use the term here to describe exactly what
the first generation of legal feminist theorists and academics did to law study and
practice, in creating new legal theories, new causes of action, new forms of legal
education and method, and contested categories of meaning and interpretation in
law. The study of “memes” has become part of a larger field of study of human
creativity, see e.g. Mihalyi Csikszenmihalyi, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of
Discovery and Invention (New York: Harper Collins 1996); Howard Gardner, Creating
Minds: An Anatomy of Creativity (New York: Basic Books 1993; Carrie MenkelMeadow, “Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in Legal
Education?” (2001) 6 Harv. Neg. L. Rev. 97-144.
11 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory,’ (1992) 23
Pacific Law Journal 1493.
12 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Women’s Ways of Knowing Law: Feminist Legal
Epistemology, Pedagogy and Jurisprudence,’ in N.R. Goldberger, J.M. Tarule, B.M.
Clinchy & M.F. Belenky (eds.) Knowledge, Difference and Power: Essays Inspired by
Women’s Ways of Knowing (New York, Basic Books, 1996); Martha Chamallas,
Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory (3rd ed., New York, Aspen Law and Business,
2013); Cynthia Grant Bowman and Elizabeth M. Schneider, ‘Feminist Legal Theory,
Feminist Lawmaking and the Legal Profession,’ (1998) 67 Fordham Law Review
249; Patricia Cain, ‘Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, (1989-90) 4
10Richard
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and doctrine, the creation of new concepts, causes of actions, or legal “memes,” the

creation of new courses and methods for learning law, 13 whether and how our new
epistemology should be integrated (or more controversially “assimilated”) into
mainstream American law doctrine and education, 14 how we have or have not

influenced the legal academy and legal thought generally, as well as legal practice
and law reform measures, and what lessons we offer for future generations of

“outsiders” who are increasingly populating our profession with more diverse
bodies and ideas.

It is common to speak of at least four stages of modern American legal

feminism as theories in the development of different conceptions of women’s issues

with and in the law. The first generation, now called “equality” feminism, focused on

seeing the equivalence of men and women as human beings entitled to many “equal”
rights, including entrance into the Bar itself 15 (and later, the professoriate). Early

entrants to both the bar and the professoriate concentrated on seeing women and

men as entitled to the same legal rights, and both litigated and educated to achieve
as much gender parity as possible in the doctrine of law itself, 16 in law school

classrooms, and in the practice of law. Our most distinguished first explicitly selfidentifying feminist law professors, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Herma Kay, Barbara

Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 191; Katherine T, Bartlett (1990) “Feminist Legal
Methods,” 103 Harvard Law Review 829.
13 Katherine Bartlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods, (1990), 103 Harvard Law Review
829; Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Shari Seidman Diamond, (1991)‘The Content,
Method and Epistemology of Gender in Socio-Legal Studies,’ 25 Law & Society
Review 221.
14 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory,’ (1992) 23 Pacific
Law Journal 1493.
15 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1872). Barbara Babcock, Woman
Lawyer: The Trials of Clara Foltz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).
16 In the early years of the equality movement, much attention was spent on
changing male pronouns and language in statutes to either more inclusive or neutral
pronouns (s/he, they, he or she), a movement calling for “gender neutrality” in the
law. This was uncontroversial in some subject areas, but much more controversial
in others (definitions of rape, pregnancy and reproductive rights, etc.) and began to
expose the difficulty of assuming true existential “equality” or equivalence where
trying to achieve legal substantive equality (sometimes requiring “different” or
“special” treatment, see below).
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954126
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Babcock, Wendy Williams, Nadine Taub, Rhonda Copelon and others (in the late

1960s and 1970s) began work on the first women’s rights and sex discrimination

casebooks, development of legal strategies for claims and assertion of “equal rights”
in legislatures and courts, and courses that focused on women’s issues in the law
(employment, reproductive rights, criminal law, domestic relations and an

assortment of laws that either ignored women or excluded them from legal rights
and responsibilities that men had. 17)

The second generation (of which I am a part), often educated in the exciting

and turbulent years of the growth of the “second wave” of feminism in the larger

American political and social culture 18 and the development of “women’s studies” as

an academic field, 19 later became known as “difference” or “cultural” feminism,

because of its focus on the differences, rather than the similarities, between men

and women (including the treatment of pregnancy and child-leave legal issues) and
the controversial valorization of “women’s particular values” (to be brought to law,
culture, and other institutional aspects of organizational and social life).

As more fully outlined below, in a series of important legal issues and cases,

these generations and the issues they represented engaged in a variety of creative
conflicts about how many legal issues should be treated (prostitution, 20

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Elizabeth Schneider, ‘The Dialectics of Rights
and Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s Movement,’ (1986) 61 NYU Law
Review 589.
18 Betty Freidan, Feminine Mystique, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963); Gloria
Steinem, Outrageous Acts and Everyday Rebellions, (New York: New American
Library, 1983); Germaine Greer, The Female Eunuch (New York: Harper Collins
1970); Kate Millett, Sexual Politics , ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1969);
Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract ( Stanford University Press, 1988); Sara Evans,
Personal Politics: The Roots of Women’s Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and
the New Left (1980) (chronicling “second wave” feminism).
19 Margaret Anderson, Thinking About Women: Sociological Perspectives on Sex and
Gender (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1993); Suzanne Kessler and Wendy
McKenna, Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press (1978); Beth B. Hess and Myra Marx Ferree, Analyzing Gender: A Handbook of
Social Science Research (Newbery Park, Calif., Sage Publications, (1987); Carol
Tavris, The Mismeasure of Women (New York: Simon & Schuster: 1992).
20 See e.g. Deborah Rhode, Justice and Gender (1989) pp. 253-257; Dorchen
Leidholdt, ‘Prostitution: A Violation of Women’s Human Rights,’ (1993) 1 Cardozo
17
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pornography, 21 rape, 22 pregnancy, 23 and employment 24), resulting in some

fractures and breaks in theory, ideology and practice. 25 As I review more fully

below, some of these complex controversies and debates recapitulated, for those of
us who knew women’s history, the divisions in the nineteenth century women’s

suffrage movement in the United States (which divided over anti-slavery abolitionist
and “women’s” rights). 26 If women were different from men in some ways (both
physical/biological and socialized behaviors), how the law should treat these

differences was very complicated. And this generation also began to observe, though
comparative law and social practice study, that different legal systems treated such
differences differently (e.g. pregnancy and child care and employment policies in
Europe). 27

Women’s Law Journal 133; Amy Cohen & Aya Gruber, ‘Governance Feminism in
New York’s Alternative “Human Trafficking Intervention Courts,” in Governance
Feminism: A Handbook (Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswarn, Rachel Rebouche & Hila
Shamir, eds, University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming).
21 Catherine MacKinnon, ‘Not a Moral Issue,’ in Feminism Unmodified (Harvard
University Press, 1987); Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women
(1989); American Booksellers v. Hudnut (771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir 1985), aff’d 106 Sup.
Ct. 1172 (1986)
22 Frances Olsen, ‘Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis in Feminist
Legal Theory,’ (1984) 63 Texas Law Review 387.
23 Sylvia Law, ‘Rethinking Sex and the Constitution,’ (1984) 132 U. Penn. Law
Review 955.
24 See conflicts over women’s employment in the case of EEOC v. Sears, 628 F. Supp
1264 (N. D. Ill. 1986), affirmed 839 F. 2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) and protective labor
legislation, discussed more fully in the text and in Richard Chused and Wendy
Williams, Gendered Law in American History (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina
Press, 2016), chapters 9 and 10.
25 For representative articles and cases of this period see Frances Olsen (ed.)
Feminist Legal Theory, Vols. I and II (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995); Katherine
Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy (eds.) , Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law and
Gender (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press (1991); Elizabeth Schneider &
Stephanie Wildman, Women and the Law Stories (New York: Foundation Press
2011).
26 Ellen Dubois, Feminism and Suffrage: The Emergence of an Independent Woman’s
Movement in America 1848-1869 (1978) (now called “first wave feminism in
American history); Ibid, Chused and Williams, chapters 1 and 8.
27 Barbara Bergmann, Saving Children from Poverty: What the United States Could
Learn from France (1996).
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954126
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Differences themselves were highly contested by feminist law professors and

theorists as feminist theorist and activist Catherine MacKinnon focused on an
explanatory sexual “dominance” by men approach 28 and others attributed
“difference” to women’s childbearing potential or more socialized “caring”

natures. 29 Although present (and latent in some ways) in the first generation, the

claim by lesbian feminist law professors 30 that first generation feminism assumed
heterosexuality in its theory and practice, began to sow the seeds of complexity of
identity, as an assumed “essentialism” of “womanhood” (resulting in more
divisions in legal theory development and practice.)

Second generation feminism also produced more explicit courses in law

schools on “women’s rights/ gender discrimination, 31 feminist legal theory,

women’s legal clinics (e.g. domestic violence, 32 employment discrimination, 33 etc.)

Catherine Mackinnon, ‘Difference and Dominance,’ in Feminism Unmodified,
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987); Catherine MacKinnon, ‘
Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law,’ (1991) 100 Yale L. J. 1281..
29 Robin West, ‘ Jurisprudence and Gender,’ (1988) 55 University Of Chicago Law
Review 1; Id. Caring For Justice (New York: NYU Press, 1997) ; Carrie MenkelMeadow, ‘Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on A Women’s Lawyering
Process, ‘ (1985) 1 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 39; Martha Fineman, ‘Challenging
Law: Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist Scholarship, (1990), 42
Florida Law Review 25.
30 Rhonda R. Rivera, ‘Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual
Persons in the United States,’ (1978) 30 Hastings L.J. 799; Patricia Cain, Rainbow
Rights, The Role of Lawyers and Courts in the Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights Movement
(2000); Nan Hunter, ‘Sexuality and Civil Rights: Re-Imagining Anti-Discrimination
Laws, (2000) 17 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 565-587.
31 Uses of the words “sex” discrimination, “gender” discrimination and “feminist” or
“gender studies and theory” roiled some of the early years of academic theory
development and teaching in the field. None of these terms were conceptually
“neutral.” Whether to problematize “sex” as a biological or socialized category and
whether to include men and masculinity studies as a more expanded “gender
discrimination” concern became significant in theory building and litigation
strategies., Ann C. McGinley and Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities and the Law
(New York: NYU Press, 2012).
32 Elizabeth Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking (New Haven: Yale
University Press 2002).
33 Laura Sager’s Civil Litigation Employment Discrimination clinic at NYU is
decades old.
28
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and more participatory and experiential methods of teaching (drawing from the
women’s liberation movement method of “consciousness raising” 34).

A deep challenge to legal feminism came (as it did to feminism in the United

States generally), from women of color, various ethnic, racial, religious and “nonwhite” women, and also women from working classes who argued in a variety of

venues that American legal feminism was “essentialist,” middle class, and “white.” 35
With the increased (though still highly marginalized) representation of more

diverse women in the legal professoriate, theorists and activists Angela Harris,

Patricia Williams, Kimberle Crenshaw, Mari Matsuda, and others 36 interrogated the

assumptions of an “essential” feminist theory and called for both new

conceptualizations (e.g. “intersectionality” 37) and new legal claims in a wide variety

of legal subjects (e.g., criminal, family, discrimination and employment law). As

more fully canvassed below, these law professors were often identified with other
legal movements (e.g., critical legal studies, 38 critical race theory, 39 lat-crit

Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Women's Ways of "Knowing" Law: Feminist Legal
Epistemology, Pedagogy, and Jurisprudence, in Knowledge, Difference and Power
(Bilenky, Clinchy, Goldberger & Tarule, editors) New York: Basic Books, 1996.
35 Angela Harris, ‘Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,’ (1990) 42
Stanford Law Review 581; Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman (1988); bell hooks,
‘Essentialism and Experience,’ (1991) 3 American Literary History 172; Gloria T.
Hull, All the Women Are White, All the Blacks are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave
(Feminist Press: 1982); Kimberle Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics (1989), University of Chicago Forum ; C. Moraga & G.
Anzaldua, (eds) This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color (2nd
ed. 1983).
36 Mari Matsuda, Where is Your Body? (Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 1996); Patricia
Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press,1991).
37 Kimberle Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity, Politics and
Violence Against Women of Color,’ (1991) 43 Stanford Law Review 1241.
38 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies and Legal
Education, or the “Fem-Crits” Go to Law School,’ (1988) 38 Journal of Legal
Education 61
39 Kimberle Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller and Kendall Thomas, (eds.) Critical
Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement (1995).; Adrienne Wing,
Critical Race Feminism: A Reader, 2nd ed. (2007).
34
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theory 40), which provoked a turn to “identity” in legal theory and practice. 41

Whether called “multi-cultural feminism” 42 or diversity feminism, the contributions

of a far more diverse professoriate expanded legal ideas, legal claims and a variety
of new courses and programs in American legal education. 43 Within this context a
series of claims and arguments were made that gender (sociological) or sex

(biological) could and did have different effects when added to other biological,

socially constructed, or identity characteristics, sometimes called “sex plus” theories
and practices.

Another major challenge disrupted the development of the ideas of modern

legal feminism, when fueled by “identity” politics, “queer theory,” 44 and concerns

about “essentialism,” when linked to the “post-modern” turn in academic theory

generally. Now called “post-modern feminism”, 45 borrowing from theories of post-

modernism in literary and philosophical scholarship more generally, these theories

challenge conventional categories of law, knowledge and epistemology generally. At
least one post-modern feminist (and gender and trans-gender theorist) has called

Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanicic, The Latino/a Condition: A Critical Reader
(2nded. 2010); Margaret Montoya, ‘Mascaras, Trenzas, Y Grenas: Un/Masking the
Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse,’ (1994), 17 Harvard
Women’s Law Journal 185 (1994).
41 Devon Carbado and MItu Gulati, Acting White: Rethinking Race in Post-Racial
America (Oxford Univ Press 2013); Ian Haney Lopez, White By Law (New York: NYU
Press, 1996).
42 Ellen Dubois and Vicki Ruiz, (eds.) Unequal Sisters: An Inclusive Reader in U.S.
Women’s History (New York: Routledge, 4th ed. 2007).
43 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession
Making New Voices in the Law,’ (1987) 42 University of Miami Law Review 29
(1987).
44 Martha Albertson Fineman, Jack E. Jackson and Adam Romero, Feminist and Queer
Legal Theory: Intimate Encounters, Uncomfortable Conversations (Farnham: UK;
Ashgate, 2009).
45 Mary Jo Frug, Postmodern Feminism (New York: Routledge, 1992); Judith Butler.
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge
1990); Ann Scales, ‘Post-structuralism on Trial,” in Fineman, ibid, note 44.
40
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for a “break” from feminism 46 and a rethinking of all categories that are reified in
law and gender difference.

In the rest of this chapter I will elaborate on how the increased numbers and

diversification of the American legal professoriate to include women, of many races,
cultures, ethnicities and classes, has altered, contributed to and challenged

traditional legal ideas or “memes”, including challenges to legal concepts, legal

practice and also to legal education. As I am a participant-observer in these

processes, it is important to remember that this narrative is likely contested by

others who have also contributed to or studied these processes, and also to see a
parallel and more conventional story that simply recounts the addition of more
women professors, many of whom seek a more simple assimilation to the law

professoriate, as doctrinal or clinical or lawyering skills professors, in a wide variety
of subjects which, to them, are not necessarily affected by or influenced by feminist
theoretical concerns. I will argue here, however, that whatever their sources, an

important number of ideas and methods have indeed been “mainstreamed” from
feminist legal thought into American law and legal education.
II. The First Generation: Equality

Women began trickling into the legal academy one by one in the early to mid-

twentieth century, after the first few women lawyers had won their battles to study

law, either as apprentices to relatives or other progressive men, and state by state to
gain licensure. In the United States legal education had been primarily a private,

apprenticeship process until well into the latter half of the nineteenth century, when
men could enter the profession either through apprenticeship or law study. The

early part of the twentieth century in American legal education was characterized

by several controversial projects to “professionalize” law training by requiring some
admissions standards, beginning to require college degrees before law study, and

the installation of the famous “Langdellian method” of inductive study of cases in a
Jane Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism (2006);
writing also as Ian Halley, see ‘Queer Theory by Men,’ in Fineman, Ibid, note 44.
46
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law school to derive common law principles. 47 There continued to be a bifurcation
of law study in law offices and law schools, and also between private proprietary

for-profit schools and university law schools for decades before women finally were
admitted to formal law study.

Unlike in medicine, although a few law schools attempted to be for “women

only” (Portia Law School in Boston and Washington College of Law in the District of
Columbia in the late 19th century), a few law schools began to admit women,

alongside men, in the early 20th century, but with a few exceptions (University of

Michigan 48) most of the elite schools (Ivy League) in the United States did not admit
women until mid-century. Harvard, one of the latest to admit women (in 1950),

hired, in 1947, its first women law professor, the brilliant Soia Mentschikoff 49 (born
in Russia, but educated in the United States, and later married to one of the most
distinguished American law professors, Karl Llewellyn (drafter of the Uniform

Commercial Code) before women law students were admitted. If anyone exemplifies

this first generation it was Dean Mentschikoff—brilliant as a legal practitioner,
academic, teacher and scholar and an expert in traditionally male fields—

commercial and labor law and Socratic legal method. Though she served as a role
model to many women in academe (notably former Dean (Berkeley) Herma Kay

Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850’s to the 1980s
(Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press,1983); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Too
Little Theory, Too Little Practice: Steven's Law School,’ 1985 Am. B. F. Res. J. 675-690. Tom
C. Grey, ‘Langdell’s Orthodoxy,’ (1983) University of Pittsburg Law Review.
48 See V. Drachman, note 4 .
49 Soia Mentschikoff was a woman of many firsts. She was a first women partner in
two Wall Street law firms after graduating from Columbia Law School, she actually
did some of the drafting of the UCC, and was the first woman Reporter for a
Restatement of the Law for the American Law Institute; she was the first woman
hired as a professor at the University of Chicago Law School (after her alma mater
Columbia would not hire her) and she later became a Dean at the University of
Miami and the first women President of the Association of American Law Schools. In
my field, she was renowned for writing some of the first academic (and empirical)
studies about commercial, labor and international arbitration and mediation.
Decades of her students, male and female, extolled her teaching abilities, including
mastery of the Langdellian (or Kingsfeldian, see John Jay Osborn, The Paper Chase,
1971) method of rigorous Socratic questioning of students to derive common law
principles.

47
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who studied at the University of Chicago when Mentschikoff was a professor there),
her project was professionally traditionally legal –no feminist theory to speak or
write of.

Others who followed shortly after her (such as Dean Kay) also excelled in

traditional male subjects (conflicts of law, oil and gas law, business law, trusts and
estates) but many also began, whether from choice or not, to take on some of the

“women’s subjects”—family and domestic relations law-- and often proudly worked
on law reform projects in those areas.

The first generation of women law professors also included a woman known

to most readers of this essay, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, first at Rutgers University in

New Jersey, then as the first tenured woman law professor at Columbia (1972), 50

later second woman Justice on the United States Supreme Court (after serving for
many years on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals). Justice Ginsburg, along
with my former (now retired, Georgetown) colleague Wendy Webster Williams
were architects of a litigation strategy that took many “gender” equality cases
through the federal courts, as both of them served both as professors and as

litigators (and occasionally as legislative draftspersons 51) to articulate the legal

policy that women were, in every relevant way, “equal” to men and deserving of all

In the 1970s as a young scholar (at the University of Pennsylvania law school) I
was often asked to write reviews and letters of recommendations for Professor
Ginsburg as several schools tried to hire her away from Columbia because they were
interested in getting her husband (a distinguished tax practitioner and scholar, and
later my colleague at Georgetown) to join them. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘A
Special Kind of Equality: Remarks for the Acceptance of the Wendy Webster
Williams Award for “Significant Contributions to Gender Equality Through Law” on
behalf of Award Recipient The Honorable Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,’ (2000) 2
Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law 149.
51 Professor Williams was largely responsible for drafting the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (amendment to the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibiting
discrimination in employment, after several cases held that pregnancy
discrimination was not “sex” discrimination, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
Pregnancy was, after the new Act, to be treated “equally” to other “temporary
disabilities” affecting work and benefits.
50
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rights of legal equality. 52 In the litigation brought by Justice Ginsburg when she was
the founding lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union’s Women’s Right Project,
she often represented men to obtain recognition of “equal rights” (e.g., for federal

widow (widower) benefits 53) of both genders to jobs, federal and state benefits (and
“burdens” as well, including estate administration and taxation). The commitment
of this first generation was to “equality” tout court, men and women were equal in
competence, ability to work, provide for families, to think and to engage in

reproductive behavior. Therefore, all laws that treated the genders differently
should be reversed and made to include both genders within their ambit.

This was the commitment to see “equality” as the basic idea in legal

formation of laws, conceptions of human beings and legal duties and

responsibilities. In the 1980s and 1990s a series of Task Forces, sponsored by
national and state bar associations (e.g., American Bar Association on the

Commission on Women 54) and courts (many of the major American federal courts of

appeals and some state systems), conducted extensive studies and issued many
reports on such issues as underrepresentation of women in the judiciary, the

treatment of women lawyers, witnesses, court employees and substantive legal
issues, all to be reformed in the name of equality and parity. 55

Wendy W. Williams, “Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate,” (1984-85) 13 New York University Review of
Law and Social Change 325.
53 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
54 Chaired at one point by Hillary Rodham (Clinton). See also Commission on
Women in the Profession, American Bar Association, Elusive Equality: The
Experiences of Women in Leal Education (1996).
55 See e.g., Judith Resnik , ‘Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts,’ (1993) Yale
Research Paper, commenting on Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force Report
(Procter Hug, J.); Vicki Jackson, ‘What Judges Can Learn from Gender Bias Task
Forces,’ (1997) 81 Judicature 15; Report of the DC Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 84
Georgetown Law Journal 1651 (1996) ; See Elizabeth Schneider, Task Force Reports
on Women in the Courts: The Challenge for Legal Education, 38 Journal of Legal
Education 87 (1988); Barbara A. Babcock, ‘Introduction: Gender Bias in the Courts
and Civic and Legal Education,’ (1993) 45 Stanford Law Review 2143.; see Bowman
and Schneider, note 3.
52
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As this first generation focused on a litigation strategy of equality, using both

“equal protection” Constitutional theories and a variety of statutory and other

claims, a growing number of first law students, and then feminist law teachers,

began to offer courses in “Women in the Law” or “Sex Discrimination ” to study all

the categories of law in which the equality principle required legal revision These
courses were often taught with ad hoc prepared material (my own course first

taught in 1973), but eventually with a series of new texts and casebooks on Sex

Discrimination Law or Women’s Rights. 56 In 1971, a male Yale Law professor joined

with several of his students to provide the legal justification for a new Constitutional
amendment, (the Equal Rights Amendment) to make “equality” of the genders a
foundational principle. 57 This was the second time in American history such an

amendment was proposed. The original amendment proposed by Alice Paul 58 in the
early 20th century failed to gain appropriate approval, as women’s suffrage became

the dominant issue and “other” women’s rights were treated as either secondary or
interfering with the politics of suffrage.

Legal academics began writing articles to argue about what “equality” meant

for parenting, criminal responsibility, protection from violence, property rights,

employment, education, contracting, inheritance, tort liability and compensation

and almost every area of law was questioned. Some argued for simple “search and
See e.g. , R. M. Davidson, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Herma Hill Kay, Text, Cases and
Materials on Sex-Based Discrimination (St. Paul: West Publications, 1974); Barbara A.
Babcock, Ann Friedman, Eleanor Holmes Norton, Susan Deller Ross, Wendy
Williams, Sex Discrimination and the Law: Causes and Remedies (Boston: Little
Brown, 1974). The first text in the field was actually written by a man (and was the
one used in my own first course in Women and the law, see Leo Kanowitz, Women
and the Law: The Unfinished Revolution (1969). Professor Kanowitz taught Women
in the Law at the University of California, Hastings until the late 1970s when women
professors took over the course. He devoted much of his distinguished career (as a
labor expert, to classic equal rights advocacy (including the ERA) and to the
elimination of all formal differences between men and women in the law.
57 Barbara Brown, Thomas I. Emerson, Gail Falk, Ann E. Freedman, (1971) ‘The
Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, ‘ 80
Yale Law Journal 871.
58 J.D. Zahniser & Amelia Fry, Alice Paul: Claiming Power (New York: Oxford Univ
Press, 2014).
56
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replace” for every time “man” or “he” appeared in a law, with a substitution of
“woman” or “she” or a search for neutral pronouns in laws.

These efforts spawned a new annual meeting, the “Women and the Law

Conference”, beginning in 1969-70, as organized by a group of New York University
Law students (among them Susan Deller Ross, who also was my colleague later on

the Georgetown Law faculty),and traveling for several decades,(not every year) until

1992, to cities on both United States coasts and in between, to bring together
feminist activist lawyers, legal academics and students to meet, discuss and

eventually argue about interpretations of law, legal strategies, cases to litigate and

organize around, and how to advocate and teach about the different areas of law. 59
During this period a number of activist law professors and lawyers began to

focus on particular areas of law requiring law reform to ensure women’s equal
participation in society. In addition to claims for increased participation and

representation in the work force (at both professional and blue collar levels),

activists created liability (criminal) for domestic violence, 60 and civil liability for

sexual harassment, 61 changed definitions of rape and consent 62 (including the first

trials of husbands raping their own wives), demanded reproductive rights (not only
access to contraception and abortion, but also changes in the treatment of

pregnancy in the workplace) and reframed many family law issues (custody

preferences in the law), as well as litigating for a variety of equalizing “benefits”
Elizabeth Schneider, ‘Feminist Lawmaking and Historical Consciousness: Bringing
the Past into the Future” (1994) 2 Virginia Journal of Social Policy and Law 1.
60 Elizabeth Schneider, Battered Women: Feminist Law Making (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2002); Clare Dalton, Battered Women and the Law (Foundation
Press, 2001); Elizabeth Schneider, Domestic Violence and the Law: Theory and
Practice (Foundation Press 2007).
61 Catherine MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment and Working Women (New Haven: Yale
University Press 1979); Nadine Taub, ‘Defining and Combatting Sexual Harassment,’
in Class, Race and Sex: The Dynamics of Control (Amy Swerdlow and Hannah
Lessinger, eds., Boston: GK. W. Hall, 1983); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57 (1986).
62 Susan Estrich, Real Rape : How the Legal System Victimizes Women Who Say No
(Yale University Press 1987); Susan Estrich, ‘Rape” (1986) 95 Yale L. J. 1087.
59
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under the law. 63 Despite the complaints of later generations that the first

generation was “white and middle class”, the records (and my own experience) of
these Women and the Law Conferences are full of workshops and materials on
Women of Color, Disabled Women, Lesbian Women, Immigrant Women, the
economics of the workforce, Single Mothers, and the rights of children. 64

These meetings and the political struggles over the meaning of the Equal

Rights Amendment (with a politically conservative movement founded by Phyllis
Schlafly to oppose it,

65with

concerns about uni-sex bathrooms, privacy, military

service and child support) began to expose the differences within legal feminism:
•

how should pregnancy be treated under law (women got pregnant;

•

men did not)

•

bodies)

should prostitution be legalized (with women in control of their own
should pornography (harmful to women in fact and image) be

regulated or banned in a country with a First Amendment guarantee
•

of free speech

•

straight women who either couldn’t or didn’t want to be married)

was feminism only about marriage equality (what about lesbians or
where were the struggles of minority or working class women in the
early cases of wage equality waged on behalf of the professional

•

classes

did women need “special” or “protected” working conditions
(especially when pregnant)

63 Accompanied by several failures, e.g.., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974),
retaining certain gender preferences in taxation, and Feeney v. Massachusetts, 442
U.S. 256 (1979) preserving the “veteran’s preference” in employment settings,
despite its obvious sex disparate outcomes.
64 See Schneider, note 59.
65 Jane J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA (University of Chicago Press, 1986) p
110. The ERA received ratification by 35 states; it required 38 to become part of the
United States Constitution.
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•

should women’s advocates fight hard in litigation to gain rights or was
it acceptable to use other methods of organizing (legal vs. political) or

dispute resolution (was mediation a “sell-out” process for women,

encouraging compromise)?

These fractures in the “equality” conception exposed that “substantive equality”
might be reached in ways that demanded “special” or “different” treatment for

women in some contexts (e.g. pregnancy leaves and benefits, as more common in
Europe 66). Could gender “parity” be better achieved by acknowledging some
“gendered” (biological/sociological) differences?

III. The Second Generation – “Difference” (or Cultural) Feminism

In the 1980’s four issues split the feminist legal community into several ideological

and practical factions: treatment of pregnancy under law, employment

discrimination litigation in the case of EEOC v. Sears, pornography (and its

regulation or treatment as a compensable tort) and the rise of a theory of “women’s
psychological (and or biological or sociological) differences” from men, made

popular by psychologist Carol Gilligan, 67 which could valorize and claim women’s
differences, from men. Social and legal justice might not depend entirely on the

legal concept of “equality” in a traditional legal sense but needed to be taken account
of in different and more complex ways.

In one of the first dramatic schisms of American legal feminism, two sets of

law professors (and activist lawyers) divided over how pregnancy should be treated
in American law. When pregnant women in several occupations were either fired

during, or not returned to their jobs after, pregnancy they sued, in both private and

public contexts, that such treatment was sex discrimination. Remarkably, the United
States Supreme Court held, in both the public and private sectors, that different

California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1982); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Portia
in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women’s Lawyering Process,’ 1 Berkeley
Women’s Law Journal 31 (1985).
66
67
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treatment of “pregnancy” (from other “temporarily” disabling conditions) was not

sex discrimination, because although only women could become pregnant, the class
of non-pregnant workers included both women and men. 68 Law professor Wendy
Webster Williams led a group of dedicated feminist activists to draft and then

advocate for passage in the United States Congress, the Pregnancy Discrimination

Act, which, when it eventually passed, required pregnancy to be treated like other
temporary disabilities. 69 This became a victory for “equality” feminists as

pregnancy was treated in employment like other short-term illnesses or absences
from work for disabling (temporary) conditions.

Unfortunately for any desired theoretical uniformity, many states in the

United States (mostly in the newer, western states) actually provided “special”

benefits for pregnant workers, whether in formal recognition of the importance of

reproduction (as many European countries gave bonuses, special leaves and other
benefits to either mothers alone or eventually to all parents 70) or as benefits for

women to keep them in the workforce as needed (in 19th century labor shortages in
the western states). California, for example, provided for guaranteed four-month

“pregnancy/maternity” leave and a guarantee of a job on return to work. This law

was challenged as sex discrimination under Title VII of the United States Civil Rights
law 71 by both the conservative Reagan administration and the National

Organization for Women (a feminist organization), for including gendered

categories within formal law. One group of professors (I was among those) wrote
briefs and argued for sustaining the law, with the recognition that, at least with
respect to pregnancy, women were indeed “different” from men and required

“accommodation” (a term used from other legislation) or “special” treatment in

Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976).
69 42 U.S.C. 2000e-k (as amended by Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978).
70 See Bergmann, ibid, note 27 and Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family
and Work Conflict and What to Do About it (New York: Oxford Press 2001).
71 42 U.S.C. 2000-e.
68
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order to achieve substantive equality (the opportunity to participate fully in the
workplace.) 72

Another group of women law professors and activists argued, on the other

side, for no formal recognition in the law of “gender-specific” differences. 73 This

group, fearing repetition of gender specific “protective” laws in the workplace

(maximum hours, minimal wages and “safe” conditions of work), which had, in the
19th century, limited women’s participation in the workforce, wanted to preserve

total equality of conditions in the workplace.

Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court sustained the “special

treatment” of pregnancy benefits, approvingly citing the brief written by law

professor Christine Littleton (my colleague at the time at UCLA Law School). 74 In

1993 one of the first bills signed into law by President William Clinton was the

Family and Medical Leave Act (allowing for unpaid leave of 12 weeks for anyone

attending to the birth, illness or required family care of a relative, in employment

sites of more than 50 employees 75). Current advocacy (unlikely to succeed any time
soon) seeks to convert such family leaves into paid leaves, as is common in much of
the rest of the developed world.

The pregnancy leave, or CalFed issue as we called it then, was the legal

embodiment of a continuing dilemma for legal feminists—when and for what

purposes do biological (or sociological) differences of the genders justify different
legal treatment? What began as a dispute with obvious biological differences

(pregnancy) next emerged with respect to what were called “socially constructed”
differences – did women have different “preferences” for the kinds of work they
sought? And if there were such differences were they “innate” to women or

structured by discriminatory expectations of employers and the larger society?
Christine Littleton, ‘Reconstructing Sexual Equality,’ (1987) 75 California Law
Review 1279; Herma Kay, ‘Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy,’ (1985) 1
Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 1.
73 Williams, Ibid, note 52; Law, Ibid. note 23
74 California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
75 Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654 (West Supp. 1995, signed into
law 1993).
72
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The case of EEOC v. Sears (1984) brought this issue to the fore, and once

again, leading legal feminist academics, this time joined by conflicting sets of

feminist historians, were on opposite sides of the case, with different underlying
conceptions of what it means to be a woman and what constitutes gender
discrimination. 76The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the

administrative tribunal tasked with enforcing employment discrimination laws)
brought a class action lawsuit against the nation’s largest (then) retailer, Sears
Roebuck, with several claims of discrimination: 1) that women were denied

employment in higher paying commission paid (not straight salary, but percentage

of total sales, usually of appliances, cars and other “larger” priced items) jobs by not
being hired for them in the first place or 2)by not being allowed to transfer to such
jobs from lower paid salaried jobs and 3) lower wages for certain classes of work.
Typically such cases were proven by two different theories – explicit disparate

treatment or more complicated, disparate impact (the effects, demonstrated by
statistically significant empirical exclusion, of so-called “neutral” employment

rules).

The EEOC hired as its expert a prize-winning women’s historian, Rosalind

Rosenberg, 77 who testified and presented affidavits of opinion that women did not

seek such risker, “harder” jobs, but preferred to work with the greater certainty and
ease of “softer” item jobs; therefore the absence of women in such jobs was the

result of their “choice,” not the result of employer discrimination. On the other side
was an equally notable women’s historian (of labor in particular), Alice Kessler

Harris 78 who testified that if women did not apply for or get hired for those jobs it
was due to discriminatory factors, including both those explicitly and subtly

enforced by employers, as well as by “socially constructed” expectations of the
larger society which constructed the labor market. Professor Kessler Harris’

See Ruth Milkman, ‘Women’s History and the Sears Case,’ (1986) 12 Feminist
Studies 375.
77 Rosalind Rosenberg, Beyond Separate Spheres: Intellectual Roots of Modern
Feminism (New Haven: Yale University Press 1982).
78 Alice Kessler Harris, Out to Work: A History of Wage Earning Women in the United
States (1982).
76
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testimony and affidavits described many situations in which women, were in fact,

quite interested in more difficult, harder machinery employment (e.g. during World
War II and among different classes of workers). Both the trial and appellate courts,
despite many briefs and arguments from feminist historians and law professors on
the plaintiff’s side, 79 ruled in favor of Sears (finding no evidence of discrimination)
and for the most part, not taking much notice of the larger debate among the
academics on both sides of the case. 80

In this case most feminist legal academics (but not all!) were aligned with the

Kessler-Harris-plaintiff side of the case. Even if some women might have had

different “preferences” for particular jobs, those preferences were likely the product
of discriminatory “socialization” processes, not physical or biological differences,

and the “preferences” (whether real or not) of some should never prevent the hiring
or promotion of the few who actively sought or wanted such jobs and should have

been encouraged to apply for them. Thus, issues of litigation strategy (class actions
vs. individual cases; disparate treatment and disparate impact, statistical vs.

testimonial evidence) made more complex some of the underlying conceptions of
gender and its treatment in the law.

The next and probably most dramatic split among legal feminists came with

what later became known as the “pornography debate.” As perhaps the most

original and important feminist legal theorist of this time, Catherine Mackinnon’s
“sexual dominance” theory of women’s subordination became a powerful

organizing principle for the feminist movement, as class had been for Marx. 81
Professor Rosenberg was denounced at several academic historians meetings for
her work for Sears and later wrote that she was isolated by other feminist
historians. In this case Professor Kessler Harris commanded the greater number of
supporters among legal academics, including many who were “special” or
“difference” feminists in other contexts.
80 See discussion in Chused and Williams, Ibid note 24.
81 See Catherine Mackinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law,
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press 1987); Id. Toward a Feminist Theory of the
State (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press 1989); Id. ‘Feminism, Marxism,
Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, ‘(1982) 7 Signs Journal of Women In
Culture and Society 515.
79
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Already one of the creative “authors” of the new legal theory of sexual harassment
as a civil wrong (tort) and ultimately an employment discrimination theory, 82

Mackinnon partnered with feminist activist Andrea Dworkin to frame a creative

cause of action to attack the abuse of women in pornography. Rather than arguing
for the criminalization of pornography, which given American Constitutional law,
was likely to meet with freedom of speech (First Amendment) objections, 83

Mackinnon framed a civil action (tort) which permitted any women who was

“harmed” in any way by pornography to bring a damage action against the offending
pornographers. The harms covered by the statute she wrote included not only the

physical harms to those who acted in pornography films or photography but harms
experienced by any woman who could prove she had been ill used (dominated by
men, coerced in any way) or affected adversely by pornographic-subordinated

depictions of women. The city of Minneapolis (Mackinnon taught at the University of
Minnesota) and Indianapolis (in alignment with some conservative forces) enacted
Mackinnon’s famous pornography ordinance, allowing such civil actions to be
brought.

This was among the most creative forms of feminist lawmaking ever—

reconceptualization of a harm to be rectified by a civil action and monetary damages
(and injunctions) rather than criminal punishment, with women, rather than men,
defining for themselves what was considered harmful. 84 Almost immediately,
another group of feminists, aligned with freedom of speech and expression
advocates, and the more sexual liberation and lesbian part of the feminist

Catherine Mackinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (New Haven: Yale
University Press 1979).
83 Catherine Mackinnon, Only Words (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
1993).
84 See explication of this legal story by one of the nation’s great constitutional
scholars in Paul Brest, & N. Vandenberg, ‘Politics, Feminism and the Constitution:
The Anti-pornography Movement in Minneapolis,’ (1987) 39 Stanford Law Review
607.
82
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movement aligned against Mackinnon and the Anti-pornography movement and
joined in lawsuits to have the new statute declared unconstitutional. 85

There ensued a storm of controversies, conferences and highly politicized

confrontations between several parts of the feminist movement. Those opposing the
anti-pornography ordinance claimed it was based on a theory of women’s passivity
and inability to choose (and even consume) different models and practices of

sexuality and that it would result in censorship of such important books as the
feminist manifesto for health (with sexually explicit photographs), Our Bodies,

Ourselves by the Boston Women’s Health Collective, a virtual “bible” of women’s

health issues for the feminist movement. 86 On the anti-pornography side, feminist

legal theorists and practitioners argued that the ordinance gave women the right to
choose their own litigation strategies and to seek compensation and other relief for
domestic violence “caused” by pornography. 87 For several years, formerly good

friends and compatriots in the feminist legal movement argued with each other,

both in public and privately, and some stopped speaking to each other altogether.
Ultimately, the anti-censorship movement won their victory in the US Supreme

Court when the court struck down the ordinance as violative of First Amendment
protections for free speech and expression (as being too vague and overbroad.) 88

See e.g. Sylvia Law and Nan Hunter, Brief Amicus Curiae of Feminist AntiCensorship Task Force et. Al in American Booksellers v . Hudnut, (1987) 21 Michigan
Journal of Law Reform 69 (known as the FACT “brief” arguing against censorship or
explicitly sexual materials as detrimental to women’s freedom of choice).
86 Our Bodies, Ourselves (Boston: Boston Women’s Health Collective, first published
in 1971).
87 This claim of causation in turn led to an explosive period in social science and law
as scholars and social scientists tried to “prove” or disprove that pornography was a
contributing “cause” of men’s violence toward women, see Neil Malamuth, (1998).
Commentary on pornography research and testimony before the Attorney
General’s Commission on Pornography. 13 Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 528529 -543; Attorney General Commission on Pornography (1987).
88 American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). The United States
Supreme Court has an extensive and complex jurisprudence on when and how
pornography and obscenity can be regulated, restricted or criminalized (famously,
“we know it when we see it”, see Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Potter
Stewart, J. concurrence).
85
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The issues of women’s “equality” or “sameness” or “differences” from men

(and from each other) were formed in the disputes that arose around legal

strategies in particular cases. In the mid-1980’s these issues grew larger with a new
generation of feminist jurisprudents and theorists who explored gender differences
through philosophical, sociological, psychological and literary criticism lenses. 89 In

1982 Carol Gilligan, a developmental and social psychologist, published In A

Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, 90 which argued,

from several empirical studies, that women and men engaged in different styles of

moral reasoning, with boys using a “logic” of individualism, property and ownership
principles and hierarchical values, and girls using a “web of connection” to hold

people and values together simultaneously in a more “horizontal” relationship. This
book and its theories exploded with acclaim and derision in feminist theory
generally and in law in particular. 91

Equality feminists feared that acknowledgement of any biological or

sociological “differences” would allow legal concepts and doctrines to continue to

support different and subordinate treatment of women in so many spheres of legal
See e.g. Robin West, ‘The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory,’ (1987) 2 Wisconsin Women’s
Law Journal 81; Robin West, ‘Jurisprudence and Gender,” (1988) 55 University of
Chicago Law Review 1; Robin West, Caring for Justice (New York: NYU Press 1997).
See also Hester Eisenstein and Alice Jardine, eds. The Future of Difference (New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press 1985); Virginia Goldner, ‘Toward
a Critical Relational Theory of Gender,’ 1992, 1 Psychoanalytic Dialogues 249; .
90 Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s
Development (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1982); see also Joan C.
Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (New York:
Routledge 1993).
91 I was among the protagonists in the legal theory disputes, see Ellen DuBois, Mary
C. Dunlap, Carol Gilligan, Catherine Mackinnon and Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
‘Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law—A Conversation,’ (1985) 34 Buffalo
Law Review 11; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations
on a Women’s Lawyering Process (1985) 1 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 39;
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender Feminism and Legal
Ethics, (1994) 2 Virginia Journal of Social Policy and Law 75. See Symposium
Women and Morality, (1983) 50 Social Research 487-695.
89
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regulation 92—family law, labor law (“protective” labor legislation), criminal law,

and economic regulations, as well as the all important interpretations of the Equal
Protection clause in Constitutional law. “Difference” feminists sought legal and

nuanced recognition of the complexity of gender identity and social structuring.,
optimistically believing that the law would be able to distinguish unlawful

subordinate treatments (exclusion of women) from necessary acknowledgement of
different treatment (pregnancy) and even some “temporary” affirmative action of
special treatment to achieve substantive equality. 93 Many “difference” feminists

took their arguments from biological and social science, as well as from European

literary and psychoanalytic theory, particularly the work of French feminists, Julie
Kristeva, Helene Cixious and Luce Iragary 94who deconstructed the oppression of

gender in body, language and philosophy to recreate a “feminine” new consciousness
in self-conception, writing, literature, morality, physicality and ultimately a

valorization of “the feminine” for an alternative “truth.” (see discussion of postmodernism in Section V below).

Although “equality” feminists and “difference” feminists often shared the

same goals of removal of oppressive and exclusionary laws and legal treatment of
women that would encourage their equal participation in social, legal, work and

family life, these schools of thought differed on whether it mattered if the “origins”
of differences were traced to “essentialist” and biological “sex” or socially

constructed or socialized “gender” ( a debate now raging in the transgender, LGBT
human rights movement). “Difference” feminists who focused on socially

constructed difference were labeled “cultural feminists,” both by themselves and
others because they often argued that regardless of its origins, women’s

“connection” to others (notably children and family) and heightened sense of

responsibility, produced a different conception of the purposes of law –to provide

Joan Williams, ‘Deconstructing Gender,’ (1989) 87 Michigan Law Review 797.
93 See arguments canvassed in desegregation of Virginia Military Institute, United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
94 Domna Stanton, ‘Language and Revolution: The Franco-American Dis-Connection,’
in The Future of Difference (Hester Eisenstein and Alice Jardine, eds. New Brunswick,
N.J. Rutgers University Press (1985).
92
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positive rights (not only liberal values of autonomy) but social welfare rights and
different conceptions of constitutional obligations and duties, as well as different
conceptions of tort and contractual liability. 95 My own work on negotiation and

legal dispute resolution (in “adjectival” or procedural law) sought to reconstruct

conventional categories of game theoretic distributional and legal adversarial “zerosum” acts of competition over scarce resources to the recognition in legal problem

solving of needs and interest based efforts to pursue joint, not only individual, gain
and social resource expansion and more “just” and integrative allocations. 96
Thus, cultural or difference feminists made enormously creative

interventions into the jurisprudential discussions of what law is for, what ends it
should serve, what legal claims can be made, what processes should be used to

effectuate its aims and what remedies it should offer. Although equality feminist
theorists accused difference feminists of assuming too much “passivity” or

deterministic definitions of identity and gender content, cultural feminists in fact

embraced more agentic and “plastic” conceptions of the role of women in the law.

Feminists could create new legal claims and theories (sexual harassment, domestic
violence, anti-pornography civil actions, “intersectionality”(see section IV below),

advocate for different interpretations of old doctrines (hedonic measures, contract
formation) and pursue new remedies (restraining orders, new forms of damages
and civil actions and new definitions of rape and domestic violence). Cultural

feminists also argued that theirs was a theoretical approach that in fact allowed for
cultural change and adaptation and a continually changing, evolving and relational

sense of gender identity and legal treatment. This argument later became important

Robin West, note 87 ; Leslie Bender, ‘A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and
Tort,’ (1988) 38 Journal of Legal Education 3; Clare Dalton, ‘An Essay in the
Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, ‘ (1984) 94 Yale Law Journal 997; Mary Jo
Frug, ‘Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of Contracts Casebooks, (1985) 34
American University Law Review 1065.
96 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, (1984) 31 UCLA Law Review 754.
95
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for the growing recognition of cultural change in gender roles and studies among
those who also focused on “masculinities.” 97

Feminist legal academics were also important in this era (1980s) in the

development of “critical feminist theory” a dialogic and critical encounter with the
New Left Critical Legal Studies movement in American Law from the 1980’s,

lingering until the late 1990s. Active in the founding of Critical Legal Studies (a left
critique of the indeterminacy of the American common and constitutional law
regimes that allowed courts to exploit their class preferences in legal

interpretation 98), feminist law professors developed a critique of Critical Legal

Studies’ own masculinist, dominating, Marxist approach to law and legal decision
making and organized the first Critical Legal Feminist meeting to use “feminist
processes” (smaller group discussions, uses of literary texts and films, uses of

feminist consciousness raising methods)and theories for discussion. 99 Critical

feminist theorists were concerned about the deconstruction of the importance of
“legal rights” as indeterminate in the critical legal studies canon of thought.

Women’s progress, after all, had been marked throughout the “equality” period with

some successful claims for “equal rights” under the “positive” law of the Constitution
and other legal statutory regimes. Opening up a serious discourse of the role of
“rights” and the State 100 in furthering or hindering civil and human rights, the
feminist critique of critical legal studies soon inspired an explosion of work in

Ann C. McGinley, Masculinity at Work (New York: NYU Press 2016).
98 Duncan Kennedy and Karl Klare, ‘A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies,’ (1984)
94 Yale Law Journal 461; Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987); Roberto Unger, Knowledge and Politics
(1975); Roberto Unger, ‘The Critical Legal Studies Movement, “ (1983) 96 Harvard
Law Review 561.
99 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies and
Legal Education, or “the Fem-Crits” Go to Law School,’ (1988) 38 Journal of Legal
Education 61.
100 See DuBois et. al, Ibid note 91 for a spirited debate about the role of the state in
improving or diminishing the quality of women’s lives.. I argued there that women’s
relationship to the state was ambivalent- both wanting its protection and promises
of equality but recognizing its role in the legalization of women’s historical
oppression.
97
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Critical Race studies, a parallel exploration of the role of legal rights and strategies
versus political and social movements in the American quest for racial justice and
equality (see Section IV below).

IV. Multi-cultural or Diversity Feminism
As newly admitted to the profession, women legal academics (mostly white)

grappled and contested with each other over issues of work, family, reproductive

rights, pornography, sex and prostitution, a third generation of new entrants, more

diverse in race and ethnicity, and somewhat more diverse in class background, burst
on the theory scene to challenge and critique the new field of feminist legal theory,

sometimes from a sympathetic “inside” view, but more often with a sense of outrage,
outsider perspective and challenge to claims of “universal” essentialism of “women’s
situation” in the law. Several powerful theorists, including Angela Harris, Patricia
Williams, Mari Matsuda and Kimberle Crenshaw, among others, awakened their
sisters in theory development to “multiple consciousness” 101 and the need to

understand and “see” the reality of the lives of women of color (Black, Asian, Latina,
Native and “other”) in both law reform and theoretical projects. At the same time,

the Lesbian challenge to heterosexist notions of marriage, family and social life also

challenged many assumptions made (whether implicitly or explicitly) in the work of
the first two generations. 102

Law professors who were/are also women of color argued that anti-

discrimination law (Crenshaw) and feminist theory in general (Harris) ignored the
particular experiences of Black (and Latina (Montoya) and Asian-American

(Matsuda) women by assuming that family and reproductive rights issues meant

challenging the “separate spheres” doctrine (women traditionally in the home, now
seeking employment) and failed to take account of the experiences of minority

Mari Matsuda, “When the first Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
Jurisprudence,’ (1989) 11 Women’s Rights Law Reporter 7.
102 See also, Francisco Valdez, ‘Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on
Identities and Inter-Connectivities,” (1995) 5 Southern California Review of Law
and Women’s Studies 25.
101
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female work (and exploitation in lower paid jobs), where the “luxury” of staying
home and the valorization, of “traditional” motherhood were often unavailable.

Stereotypes of gender when coupled with race or ethnicity (the “China doll” or Black
or Latina domestic worker) demonstrated that women of color did not share the
assumed uniform experiences of white (presumably middle class) women as

feminist theory formed on individualistic “equality” models. Women of

subordinated or dominated races and ethnicities had/have more complicated

relationships, they argued, with their similarly subordinated or dominated male

relatives, companions and group members. Thus, among the major contributions of
this newer and more diverse feminist theorizing was to :

1. problematize “equality” theories based on individual rights of access and

measurement of comparisons of “merit” to (white) men (in employment, family
rights, constitutional law);

2. question the assumptions of “women’s” experiences as mothers or rape

victims 103 as “essentially” derived from white women’s experiences;

3. demonstrate the “intersectionality” of discrimination and subordination in

more complex demographic “identities” (Black women had to be either “Black” or

“female” to succeed in early employment discrimination cases; there was no formal

legal recognition of “Black women” as a separate legally protected category; welfare

polices were often directed at conceptions of welfare recipients as “undeserving”
Black women (“the welfare queen” stereotype); 104

In American history, Black women had been raped, with impunity, for over one
hundred years, as slaves and domestic workers, see Patricia Williams, “On Being the
Object of Property, in The Alchemy of Race and Rights and ‘Alchemical Notes:
Reconstructed Ideals from Deconstructed Rights,’ (1987), 22 Harvard Civil RightsCivil Liberties Law Review 401 (describing the phenomenological differences in the
“experience” of legal rights of white and Black people).
104 Kaaryn Gustafson, ‘Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of LowIncome Women,’ (2013) 3 University of California Irvine Law Review 297; Kaaryn
Gustafson, ‘Breaking Vows: Marriage Promotion, The New Patriarchy and the
Retreat from Equalitarianism,’ (2009) 5 Stanford Journal of Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties 269.
103
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4. illuminate the complexity of group membership and contradictory pulls on

identity; minority women suffered greatly from domestic violence and at the same
time were active as mothers, sisters, daughters, wives and companions in

representing and supporting male offenders in prison and criminal justice reform
(now particularly salient again in the Black Lives Matter movement in the United
States); minority women often work for “justice” not only as women but as
members of other historically subordinated groups; 105

5. interrogate the class assumptions in much of the earlier feminist theory;

although “sex plus” doctrines sought recognition of the multiplicity of ways that
gender could be experienced through the lens of gender interacting with other

characteristics, critical race theory coupled with critical feminist race theory, 106

demonstrated that women of color often suffered from many simultaneous forms of
stereotyping and interactive identity assumptions. Thus, simple legal categories of
“gender” or “race” or “ethnicity” failed to fully capture the particular forms of
discrimination suffered and provide adequate remedies.;

6. acknowledge that different experiences of patriarchy (marriage as

desirable or not), parenthood and criminalization (disparities in drug, sexual assault,
welfare fraud definitions and law enforcement) might militate in favor of more
complicated and variable efforts to reform the law;

7. narrate the particularities of the differences of women’s lives. The brilliant

linkage of storytelling (by among, others, 107 Patricia Williams, 108 and Mari

See the difficult (for many feminists) case of Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436
U.S.49 (1978) in which tribal definitions of voting rights and citizenship was held to
“trump” gender equal protection provisions in the United States Constitution.
106 Dorothy Roberts, ‘BlackCrit Theory and the Problem of Essentialism,’ (1998) 53
U. Miami Law Review 855.; see generally Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 22 Harvard Civil Rights Civil Liberties Law Review (1987).
107 The use of storytelling and narrative to “counter” universalist legal
generalizations began with the work of Derrick Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well:
The Permanence of Racism (New York: Basic Books: 1987) (and the novelist Toni
Morrison, see e.g. Sula (1973) and Beloved (1987).
108 Patricia Williams, ‘On Being the Object of Property’ in The Alchemy of Race and
Rights: Diary of a Law Professor (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991).
105
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Matsuda 109) to challenges of conventional legal categories and the call for “outsider”
voices to be heard in legal argument and doctrinal formation has inspired a whole

new generation of critical race/gender theorists to argue against “over abstraction”
in legal theory and to “particularize” and study (empirically 110) the concrete
conditions of women’s needs in the law;

8. challenge all assumptions about male dominance of women made on

assumptions of heterosexuality;

9. recognize that gender is often “relational” to other categories of identity,

both subjective and objective, and dependent on how it is used in particular
contexts 111and

10. produce more diverse discussion and ideas in law school classrooms. 112

This paradigm shifting move to more “bottom-up,” empirical particularism

has broadened the issues of concern to feminist legal academics to a whole set of

“newer” issues of gender, legal theory and legal doctrine and policy as experienced
“on the ground”: immigration, 113 religion, human rights, globalized labor, and

prostitution 114 and human trafficking, 115 among others, often exposing the painful
divisions among feminists who have “multi-cultural” or “multi-dimensional

Mari Matsuda, Where is Your Body?: Essays on Race, Gender and the Law,
(Boston: Beacon Press (1996)
110 A new generation of critical race/gender scholars has formed around “empirical
critical race studies”, see e.g. Mario Barnes, ‘Empirical Methods and Critical Race
Theory: A Discourse on Possibilities for a Hybrid Methodology, 2016 Wisconsin Law
Review 2043; Kimani Paul-Emile, ‘Foreword: Critical Race Theory and Empirical
Methods Conference (2015) 83 Fordham Law Review 2953.
111 Martha Minow, ‘Justice Engendered: The Supreme Court Term 1986,’ (1987) 101
Harvard Law Review 10; Martha Minow, Making all the Difference: Inclusion,
Exclusion and American Law Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Press 1990).
112 Meera E. Deo, ‘Paint by Number? How Race and Gender in Law School Faculty
Affect the First Year Curriculum,’ (2010) 29 Chicano/Latino Law Review 1; Id.
‘Faculty Insights on Educational Diversity,’ (2015) 83 Fordham Law Review 3115.
113 See Jennifer Chacon, ‘Feminists at the Border: Militarism in the Work of Ann
Scales,’ (2013) 91 Denver University Law Review 85.
114 Amy J. Cohen, ‘Trauma and the Welfare State: A Genealogy of Prostitution Courts
in New York City,’ (2017) Texas Law Review.
115 Aya Gruber, Amy Cohen and Kate Mogulescu, ‘Penal Welfare and the New Human
Trafficking Intervention Courts, (2017) Florida Law Review.
109
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consciousnesses”. Consider the conflicts among this generation of feminist legal
academics on such issues as veiling and headscarves, 116 female genital

circumcision, 117 single-sex education, 118 food production and consumption, 119

military service and peace, among others. 120
V. Post-Modern Feminism

Just as demographic and theory-driven disruptions to the first waves of legal

feminisms were beginning to challenge essentialist notions of “women’s issues” and
feminist theory, intellectual movements from outside, in European post-modern
and post-structuralist theory in philosophy, literature and ultimately (through

Critical Legal Studies), American legal theory also challenged universal or

essentialist ideas about gender in law. Legal academic (Professor at New England

School of Law) Mary Jo Frug, a post-modern feminist (whose murder near her home
in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1991 was never solved) wrote most extensively at
the beginning of the “post-modernist” turn that gender is “constituted” by words,
language, interpretations by particular authoritative figures (male scholars and

judges) and she urged new conceptions of legal ideas from the “deconstructive”
analysis which became so important in literary criticism. Nothing in “modern”

categories are to be taken for granted as “stable” or fixed meanings. Women are

sometimes “equal” to or “the same as men” (perhaps in work performance), but also
The Burqa Affair Across Europe (Alessandro Ferrari and Sabrina Pastorelli, eds.)
(Routledge, 2016); S.A.S. v France, 2014 Eur. Ct. H. R. 695; R (Begum) v.
Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School, 2006 U.K. H. L. 15 (see
decisions of Brenda Hale, J.)
117 Isabelle Gunning, ‘Arrogant Perception, World-Travelling and Multicultural
Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, ‘ (1992) 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 189.
118 United States v. Virginia Military Institute, 518 U.S. 515 (1996, Ruth Ginsburg J.)
119 Amy J. Cohen, ‘Everything is Not About Convenience: State, Family, and
Supermarket in Middle-Class West Bengal’ (2017) University of California Irvine
Law Review; Id. ‘The Law and Political Economy of Contemporary Food: Some
Reflections on the Local and the Small,’ (2015) 78 Law & Contemporary Problems
101.
120 Susan Moller Okin, Is Multi-Culturalism Bad for Women? (Princeton University
Press 1999).
116
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they are different at the same time (in capacity to become pregnant and bear
children). Women are not all alike—they are different among their own

gender/biological classifications—some are white, some are of color, they have

different sexual orientations and desires, they are of different classes and they value
and identify differentially with men, with political movements and with social

institutions. They are sometimes agentic and in control of their own destinies and

sometimes they are “dominated” or “abused” or “exploited” by men. Women often
have different interpretations of the same texts (law, erotic texts, literature), but

their “power” to interpret as authority or law is often still unequal to men. Frug’s
arguments were that legal interpretations and concepts embedded in law often
“constructed” women as maternal, unequal, sexualized, terrorized and weak

(historically unable to make and enforce contracts in business, in labor, etc.). But, at
the same time Frug, and other post-modernists, saw gender and interpretation as
“fluid,” “plastic” and mutable by legal advocacy, and by textual and political
interpretation.

Frug was among the first legal academics, along with Clare Dalton, another

Contracts (at Harvard) professor to “deconstruct” common contracts doctrines

(impossibility of performance, enforceability of domestic promises) and to suggest

that feminists could (and did) successfully re-interpret conventional legal doctrines
,to produce greater gender justice. In one of her most sustained and creative works,
Frug completed a literary and legal exegesis of the conventional, male authored,
Contracts text 121 she was teaching with to interrogate and upend conventional

interpretations of what promises should be legally enforced, how women were

conceptualized in contracts cases (weak, needing of protection, lacking capacity),

how law structured remedies and how women authors might write a different text
and develop different doctrines, reclaiming women’s interests in conventional

doctrine and interpretation. 122 As I discuss in the next section, the post-modern

“move” in legal theory, while often criticized for being “indeterminate” and

J. Dawson, W. Harvey & S. Henderson, Cases and Comment on Contracts (4th ed.
1982).
122 See Mary Jo Frug, Postmodern Legal Feminism (Routledge, 1992) at 53-124.
121
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destructive of stable meaning, in fact was instrumental in opening up legal concepts
and doctrines not typically associated with “women’s issues” to feminist analysis

and re-interpretations. In this sense, the post-modernists made great and creative
contributions to new ideas in law and new methods of interpretation.

The contributions of post-modernist scholars like Frug, Dalton, later Janet

(Ian) Halley and others in the 1990s and onward were to:

1. see gender as always fluid, contingent and relational (differing in context);
2. emphasize the agency of feminists to self-describe and “perform” gender, 123

and to wrest control of definitions away from others (men, authority figures, legal
interpreters 124);

3. analyze the discursive process by which language and law both create

categories that become “reified” and made “real” but also can be destroyed or reinterpreted by different actors (consider the evolution of marital rape and the
complex issues surrounding what constitutes “consent” to rape in different
contexts 125);

4. problematize the “binary” of definitive gender lines; along with lesbians, gay

activists, trans and bi-sexual , queer theorists, 126 post-modern feminists see gender

and sex as having blurred boundaries, 127 allowing greater choice than stable legal

Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity
(Routledge, 1990)’ Id. Undoing Gender (2004).
124 An important part of feminist legal theory was to explore the epistemology of
knowledge, understanding that knowledge itself is produced and created through
the gender lenses of the creator of knowledge, see, e.g. Sandra Harding, The Science
Question in Feminism, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Sandra Harding,
Whose Science, Whose Knowledge: Thinking from Women’s Lives (Ithaca, Cornell
University Press 1991).
125 Robin West, ‘Sex, Law and Consent,’ In THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY
AND PRACTICE (Alan Wertheimer & William Miller eds. 2008); Katherine Franke,
‘Theorizing Yes,” (2001), 101 Columbia Law Review 181.
126 Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics and the
Limits of Law (Duke University Press, 2015); Janet Halley, Split Decisions: How and
Why to Take a Break From Feminism, (Princeton University Press, 2008); Eve
Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (University of California Press, 1990).
• 127 So did Sigmund Freud, in his theories of polymorphous perversity, Freud,
Sigmund. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of
Sigmund Freud. (Trans. James Strachey. 24 vols. London: Hogarth, 1953–74).
123
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gender categories permit, not only in choices about sexuality and “cross-dressing” 128
:

5. consider how the constitutive processes of law both disadvantage or

advantage gender in particular contexts and how such processes can be “used” to
create and change legal meanings. 129

Though critics fear that the fluidity and indeterminacy of interpretations

around gender and sex will hinder a “unified” theory or legal strategy to deal with
continued gender inequality, 130 the richness of the feminist deconstructive, post“structuralist” turn in questioning all legal categories, has, in my view, produced
some of the most creative interpretations, new concepts, legal memes, and
reinterpretations of law, explored below.

Vi. Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Memes in Law and Legal Education
The increased number of women legal academics in the 1980s and 1990s did not

mean they were all focused on so-called “women’s subjects.” But, with a feminist

sensibility, many of these new entrants began to question conventional “man-made”

legal doctrine, even without the literary and philosophical abstractions of poststructuralist theory. Here I review just a few of these feminist contributions to

general legal theories and doctrines. 131 As I was wont to say in the early years of this

effort some decades ago, the question of “assimilation,” “integration” or

“mainstreaming” of any “outsider” theory or doctrine is the problem of whether
Duncan Kennedy, “Sexy Dressing, Etc.: Essays on the Power and Politics of Cultural
Identity, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993).
129 Dennis Patterson, ‘Postmodernism/Feminism/Law,’ (1992) 77 Cornell Law
Review 254.
130 Catherine Mackinnon, ‘Points Against Postmodernism,’ (2000) 75 Chicago-Kent
Law Review 687.
131 For a fuller, if earlier review, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, (1992) ‘Mainstreaming
Feminist Legal Theory, 23 Pacific Law Review 1493. See also Mary Dunlap, ‘The “F”
Word: Mainstreaming and Marginalizing Feminism,’ (1989-90) 4 Berkeley’s Women
Law Journal 251 (discussing how the US Supreme Court dealt with feminist
challenges to Constitutional and other cases).
128
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there will be enough “chocolate” in the marble cake or as said more recently, more
than just “chocolate chips in the vanilla ice cream.” 132

Feminist attention to women’s issues made Constitutional “equal protection”

concepts more complex (formal or substantive equality?) (e.g., see discussion of
pregnancy above, and the “sameness-difference” debates), challenged American

conceptions of “freedom of expression” in First Amendment jurisprudence and the

pornography debate 133 (which differed from the more successful efforts of Canadian

feminists and constitutionalists on the same issue 134), changed the definitions of

rape (including marital rape) and consent in criminal law, 135 which in turn modified
important evidence doctrine, 136 introduced new criminal law defenses to murder or
injury (“battered woman syndrome” 137), created a new cause of action (under both

common law tort doctrine and also in statutory definitions of employment

discrimination) for sexual harassment, 138 and, of course, challenged many concepts
See also Richard Delgado , “The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature (1984) 132 U. Penn. Law Review 561; Menkel- Meadow, Ibid,
note 132 and “Michael” in Meera Deo, ‘Faculty Insights on Diversity in the
Classroom,’ (2015) 83 Fordham Law Review 3115, at 3147.
133 Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography, Final Report (department of
Justice, 1986), the “Meese Report”, cf. Nadine Strossen, Defending Pornography: Free
Speech, Sex and the Fight for Women’s Rights (1995); see also, Henry Louis Gates,
Anthony Griffen, Donald Lively, Robert Post, William Rubenstein and Nadine
Strossen, Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex: Hate Speech, Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties (1994); Catherine Mackinnon, Only Words (Harvard University Press,
1993).
134 Katherine Gelber and Adrienne Stone, ‘Constitutions, Gender and Freedom of
Expression,’ in Research Handbook on Gender and Constitutions (Helen Irving and
Ruth Rubio-Marin, eds. Forthcoming).
135 Susan Estrich, Real Rape (Yale University Press 1987); Carole Goldberg-Ambrose,
‘Theory, Practice and Perception in Rape Law Reform,’ (1989) 23 Law & Society
Review 949.
136 Leon Letwin, ‘Unchaste Character: Ideology and California Evidence Rape Laws,
(1980) 54 Southern California Law Review 35; Margaret Berger, ‘Man’s Trial,
Women’s Tribulations: Rape Cases in the Courtroom,’ (1977) 77 Columbia Law
Review 1.
137 Elizabeth Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Law Making (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2002).
138 Catherine Mackinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (Yale University
Press, 1978).
132
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in conventional family law (child custody, alimony and marital support, and legal
benefits for unmarried co-habitation 139).

Feminist legal theorists also contributed ideas and re-interpretations of more

conventional legal doctrines, such as the presumed “reasonable man” in American

tort law, 140 and its presumptions of a “neutral” and “objective” standard of legal
liability. Feminists questioned the definitions and assessments of compensable

harms in tort law 141 and suggested that both standards of liability and compensable
claims (a different form of loss of consortium) would apply if a “reasonable”
woman’s” conceptions were included in the tort canon (later criticized for

essentializing women as much as the male “objective” standard for correct human
behavior).

Feminist contracts scholars suggested that recognition of only commercial

contract and not domestic contracts failed to take account of legal realities, 142 such

as family owned businesses, as well as ante and post-nuptial agreements, 143 as well

as now far more complex contracting around reproductive issues. 144 Such contracts
are now often the subject of adjudication in state courts.

Grace Blumberg, ‘Adult Derivative Benefits in Social Security, (1980) 32 Stanford
Law Review 233; Grace Blumberg, ‘Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different
Perspective, (1981) 28 UCLA Law Review 1125; Frances Olsen, ‘The Family and the
Market, (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 1497.
140 Leslie Bender, ‘A Feminist Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort,’ (1988) 38
Journal of Legal Education 3; Lucinda Finley, ‘A Break in the Silence: Including
Women’s Issues in a Torts Course,’ (1989)1 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 41.
141 Robin West, ‘The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives,” (1985) 3 Wisconsin
Women’s Law Journal 81.
142 Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, (1985) 94 Yale
Law Journal 997; Mary Jo Frug, ‘Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Post-Modern
Feminist Analysis of Contract Law (1992) 140 U Penn. Law Review 1029.
143 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (California 1976) in which the California
Supreme Court enforced a contract for marital like benefits and promises made
between co-habitants who were not formally married.
144 Michele Goodwin, Baby Markets and Money: the New Politics of Creating Families
(Cambridge University Press, 2010).
139
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Feminist property scholars questioned the very definitions of legally

recognized “property” rights in ownership (slavery 145), bodies, body parts, 146

reproduction (fetuses), reputation, “intangible” interests in investments of future
spousal income, 147 and now intellectual property and property rights in culture

(presciently predicting some of the most contested issues in intellectual property
law now). 148

Beyond what are often considered “core” doctrinal areas of law, feminist

legal scholars have made many contributions and interventions in both substantive
and adjectival areas of law. A new generation of feminist scholars, has suggested
that “feminist governance” 149 (building on older theories of collaborative or

experimentalist governance and “feminist public administration” 150) will modify

administrative, legislative and even judicial regulation (in a common law system) to
be more “responsive” to the particularities of “lived experiences” in a variety of

areas (family law and domestic violence, labor conditions, prostitution and vice,
food and workplace safety), by avoiding overly generalized, universalized and
abstract ideas for regulation, and focusing instead on social problem solving,

Patricia Williams, On Being the Object of Property, (1988) 14 Signs 5.
Michele Goodwin, Black Markets: The Supply and Demands of Body Parts
(Cambridge University Press, 2006).
147 Grace Blumberg, ‘Identifying and Valuing Goodwill at Divorce,’ (1992) Law and
Contemporary Problems.
148 Margaret Radin, ‘Property and Personhood,’ (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review
957; Margaret Radin, Market (in)Alienability (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 1849;
Carol Rose, ‘Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground (1992) 78 Virginia
Law Review 421; Ruth Okedejii, ‘Contracts, Persons and Property: A Tribute to
Margaret Jane Radin, 22 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law
Review 143 (2015).
149 Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswarin, Rachel Rebouche and Hila Shamir, Governance
Feminism: A Handbook (University of Minnesota, forthcoming)
150 Cynthia Farina, ‘Getting From There to Here,’ (1991) Duke Law Journal 689;
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Lawyer’s Role in Deliberative Democracy,’ 2004-5
Nevada Law Journal 1; Kathy Ferguson, The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy
(Philadelphia, Pa: Temple University Press,1984).
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interventionist, therapeutic and preventative methods, as alternatives to punitive
and adjudicative methods, using such innovations as “problem solving courts”. 151
Like the earlier generation, of which I am a member, these governance

feminists have to confront the question of the role of the state in securing equality
and quality of life for women—in the United States (unlike in more socially

progressive countries) this is a complex and ambivalent relationship., 152 as the state
both giveth (some social security and welfare benefits, some legal protections in

domestic violence 153 and anti-discrimination law 154) and taketh away (surveillance,

criminalization of welfare and poverty 155 and sex work, work requirements, etc. and

ongoing rigid gender classifications in many legal spheres (military, some work and
labor rules).

Like their public governance sisters, modern feminist scholars of the private

corporation have urged more “feminist governance”, represented in the growing

requirement in some countries for quotas of women on governing boards, arguing
that profits are higher, management is better and corporate reputations rise with
increased representation of women. 156 These arguments for more women in

various legal and economic institutions, of course, replicate the early issues with
Judith Kaye, “Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look At
How Courts are Run,’ (1997) 48 Hastings Law Journal 851.
152 Catherine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard University
Press 1989); DuBois, Dunlap, Gilligan, Mackinnon, Menkel-Meadow, Ibid note 81;
Linda Gordon (ed.), Women, the State and Welfare (Madison: Wisc.: University of
Wisconsin Press 1990).
153 But see Jane Stoever, Mirandizing Family Justice, 39 Harvard Journal of Law and
Gender 189 (2016); Kristin Bumiller, In An Abusive State: How Neo-Liberalism
Appropriated the Feminist Movement Against Sexual Violence (Duke University
Press, 2008).
154 But see Kristin Bumiller, The Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of
Victims (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).
155 Kaaryn Gustafson, Cheating Welfare: The Criminalization of Poverty (New York:
NYU Press, 2011).
156 Linda-Eling Lee, Ric Marshall, Damion Rallis and Matt Moscardi, Women on
Boards (MSCI Research Institute, 2015); (finding that critical mass of women on
boards increased profits and decreased governance problems); Lahey and Salter,
‘Corporate Law in Legal Theory and Legal Scholarship: From Classicism to
Feminism, (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 543.
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“essentialism” – how do women “act” on corporate boards, differently than men?

More responsibly? More honestly? More relationally? Feminist political scientists

have made similar arguments for increased female representation in legislatures. 157
Similarly, feminist labor scholars have argued that the greater participation by

women in trade unions would affect both processual decision making in unions, but
also likely modify the issues of greatest salience to modern workers (health and
safety, participatory governance, as well as wages and working conditions). 158
Feminist legal scholars of the economic order have also suggested both

doctrinal and policy changes. Bankruptcy scholars (based on empirical work) have
argued that individual bankruptcies (affecting women and families) may play as

great a role in the health of an economy as corporate reorganization, and need as

much legal attention and reform. 159 Marjorie Kornhauser has argued for changes in
tax policy and increased progressivity as a feminist intervention in a corporatist,
capitalist and individualist tax system in the United States. 160

Building on second generation “cultural” or “difference” feminism, so many of

these creative suggestions for law reform depend on the claims that women will be
concerned about the “relational”, caring and interdependence of human beings in
lawmaking. When she spearheaded the attempt to overhaul the American health

care system in the mid 1990’s First Lady (later Secretary of State and Presidential

candidate) Hillary Clinton heralded this claim that the nation’s health was built on
the “interdependence” of human beings (bacteria, germs and viruses do not know
class or borders) and it “takes a village” to raise healthy children. 161

Mary Becker, ‘Politics, Differences and Economic Rights,’ (1989) University of
Chicago Legal Forum 169.
158 Marion Crain, ‘Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage
Labor, ‘ (1991) 89 Michigan Law Review 1155.
159 Theresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook, As we Forgive Our
Debtors, Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit in the United Sates (1989).
160 Marjorie Kornhauser, ‘The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax
Movement: A Typical Male Reaction(1987) 86 Michigan Law Review 465.
161 Hillary Rodham Clinton , It Takes a Village, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
HRC was an early “feminist” (part-time) legal academic when she and her husband
both taught at the University of Arkansas Law School in the early years of their
careers.
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Women in international law have for decades made similar arguments about

the need for increased inclusion of women in international law making and now in
conflict resolution, peace negotiations, and transitional justice. 162

These, and many other contributions too numerous to mention here,

demonstrate that the increased numbers of women in the legal academy has

creatively and controversially challenged much of the conventional legal canon in so
many areas of law. But note that even acknowledging these contributions continues

to raise the issue of whether women “think” or “act” differently from men (and those
who made the laws in most countries for centuries). Is there some kind of

essentialist claim that remains? Are women making contributions to legal academe
and legal thought through a “reactive” epistemology to what has gone before or

creating, with agency, different conceptions of what a legal system could provide?

These issues continue to exist not only in substantive law, but in procedural

law and education as well. American feminist legal academics have transformed

legal education by offering smaller seminars with greater personal self-disclosure,
modeled on the earlier feminist consciousness raising groups of the 1960s and
1970s. Seminars and more participatory (and clinical and experiential) legal

education are now offered in virtually every American law school. As students
demand more choice and less required curricula to meet the challenges of an

increasingly complicated world, electives have now proliferated. Some scholars note
that women professors are still disproportionately represented among those who
counsel students, administer and manage the law school (which does include

greater representation of women deans), but feminist and female (not always the
same thing) professors are also increasing their productivity and recognition in
almost every field of law.

If I had to suggest one particular contribution of modern feminist law

professors it would be called “the Contextual Turn,” as feminist legal academics have
Hillary Charlesworth, Catherine Chinkin, and Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to
International Law,’ (1991) 85 American Journal of International Law 615; Martha
Fineman and Estelle Zinsstag (eds.), Feminist Perspectives on Transitional Justice
(Belgium, Intersentia, 2013).
162
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resisted the kind of overly abstract and universalist thinking that fails to account for
so much of our human, cultural and legal variability. Feminist scholars are now

working on many particular sites of the interaction of gender and law (employment,
organizations, welfare, family life, constitutional adjudication, contracts, property

and torts, as well as newer areas of concern—migration, intellectual property, 163 or
my own special area of interest—different methods of legal and international
dispute resolution 164

VII. Conclusions: Where do we go from here? (Post-feminism?)
At the time of this writing women legal academics have made enormous inroads
into the American legal academy, though many still claim underrepresentation

(based either on comparisons to women in the workforce generally, to women in

the legal profession, to location within the academy, 165 or by race and ethnicity 166).
One scholar, however, claims that women are now, in fact, overrepresented in the

legal academy (as compared to their representation in the legal profession) and that
diversity and affirmative action programs have, in his view, been largely successful,
in the appointment of many women of color to faculties. 167 In a comprehensive

empirical study of the legal professoriate, James Lindgren argues that if any group is
underrepresented in the legal academy it is Conservatives, Christians, Republicans

and especially Republican women, but not white women, or women of color either.
See e.g.,, Dan Burk, ‘Do Patents Have Gender?’ (2011) 19 American University
Journal of Gender Social Policy and the Law 881 ; Kara Swanson, ‘Intellectual
Property, Gender: Reflections on Accomplishments and Methodology, (2015) 24
American Journal of Gender , Social Policy and the Law 175; Rebecca Tushnet,
(2007), ‘My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender and Fair Use in Copyright Law,’ 15 American
University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 273; Johanna Gibson,
Community Resources: Intellectual Property, International Trade and Protection of
Traditional Knowledge (New York: Routledge, 2005).
164 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mediation and Its Applications For Good Decision Making
and Dispute Resolution, (Belgium, Intersentia, 2016)
165 Angel, Ibid note 5 .
166 Deo, Ibid; Merritt and Reskin Ibid; see also Gabriella y Muhs et.al. eds, Presumed
Incompetent: The Interactions of Race and Class for Women in Academia (2012).
167 James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity: Law Faculties in 1997 and 2013 (2015),
163
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As of the 2013-14 academic year women constituted 35.9% of all fulltime

law teachers, men were 64.1% of full time teachers, compared to women as

constituting 32.4% of all working lawyers and men 67.6% of all working lawyers. 168
Minority (all groups combined, African-American, Asian, Hispanic and Native)

women constituted 9.4% of the legal professoriate (6.7% of the working legal

profession) and minority men constituted 10.5% of the legal professoriate (and

7.4% of the practicing legal profession 169). Women are still more likely to be found
in skills, legal writing and librarian positions in the legal academy and are also still
underrepresented among deans (144 male deans to 58 female deans in 2013) but
there has been a steady increase of women in full time academic positions and in

deanships. As of 2013, 27% of the total of legal educators were tenured male law
professors, and 16.3% were female so the gap at the top reaches of the profession
are slowly closing.

What do these numbers mean for gender equity in the legal academy? Many

years ago sociologist Rosabeth Moss Kantor, who studied women’s influence and
participation in American corporate life, argued that it took a “critical mass”

(somewhere over 30% of a particular workplace) for women to have two kinds of
efficacy in the workplace: 1) to have ideas and contributions truly “heard” and

recognized and 2) to be seen as “non-token” representatives of their demographic
group. 170 As women in the legal academy now do constitute this “critical” mass in
numbers (nationally, that is not necessarily distributed the same way at all law

schools 171), there are several consequences of this change in the American legal

ABA Approved Law School Staff and Faculty Members by Gender and Ethnicity;
Lindgren, Ibid.
169 These data are derived from the ABA data, Lindgren’s analysis that includes data
sets from the US Census, American Communities Survey 2011, 2012 and 2013.
170 Rosabeth Moss Kantor, Men and Women of the Corporation (New York: Basic
Books 1977); Joyce K. Fletcher, Disappearing Acts: Gender Power and Relational
Practice at Work (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press 1999); see also M. Torchia, A. Calabro
and M. Huse, ‘Women Directors on Corporate Boards: From Tokenism to Critical
Mass, (2011) 102 Journal of Business Ethics 299.
171 Measuring diversity in legal education includes both this “counting” of numbers,
(faculty, students, administrators) called “structural diversity,” as well as trying to
assess more “interactional diversity” –do increases in numbers of diversity of
168
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professoriate, especially when the female student body in American law schools has
been near or over 50% of the total population for about twenty years.

First, there is still some evidence of stratification by subject matter,

Constitutional law, at the top of the informal prestige scale, still has some

underrepresentation of women, though that is rapidly changing with several
distinguished women (and two former law professors) on the United States

Supreme Court (Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan) now pre-eminent in the

field (and several female Deans of major law schools who are also Constitutional

scholars, Martha Minow (Harvard), Heather Gerken (Yale), and Kathleen Sullivan

(Stanford), as well as legal historian Barbara Black (Columbia). Women now teach

and publish research in virtually every area of conventional law school study
including contracts, property, torts, civil procedure, criminal law, as well as

business subjects, commercial law, banking, bankruptcy, taxation, legal ethics,

immigration, intellectual property, labor and employment law, health law, and all

advocacy and skills subjects. This means that for women law professors who seek
“assimilation” or “integration” into the legal academy, almost every subject has

become accessible for teaching and scholarly production, whether the development

of conventional doctrinal analysis, or a particularly “feminist” take on any of these

subjects. Gone are the days of tenure denials for women who worked primarily on
“feminist” or “women’s issues.” 172

At the same time, however, the increased numbers of women in the legal

academy has ironically accompanied (or produced?) a decrease in the number of

explicitly feminist theory, jurisprudence and “women and the law” classes. Whether

this is due to the integration or assimilation of feminist concerns into Constitutional,
demographic representation actually lead to enhanced diversity of interactions in
classrooms, scholarship and governance, see Deo, Ibid.
172 Notorious cases in the 1980s included tenure denials at Harvard (Clare Dalton),
Yale (Lucinda Finley) and the University of Pennsylvania (Drucilla Cornell). My
colleagues at UCLA, Christine Littleton and Frances Olsen (mid-1980s) were among
the first to be awarded tenure precisely because they had done high quality work on
exclusively feminist issues. But see Katherine Barnes & Elizabeth Mertz, ‘Is it Fair?
Law Professors’ Perceptions of Tenure,’ (2012) 61 Journal of Legal Education 511.
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family, employment and criminal law classes and scholarship, 173 or is the product of

generational change, to a “post-feminist” era, 174 or the deconstruction of gender into

other critical “identity” concerns and courses, 175 separate treatment of feminist

theory and jurisprudence is clearly not as prominent as it was when there were

fewer female legal academics. Perhaps, as my generation likes to think, it was our

passionate commitment to feminist issues and our advocacy in both substantive and
professional participation activities that cleared the way for new generations to

work directly on all issues in the law (though issues of parental leave, tenure clocks,
etc. continue to have disparate impacts on women in the professoriate, as in the
legal profession generally. 176)

And in a greater irony, younger generations of law students (and some

faculty) have upturned some of the earliest feminist concerns. While my generation

expended enormous energy on teaching, scholarship and advocacy to have rape and
domestic violence included in the criminal law curriculum, some young women

have asked that these subjects not be taught (to avoid reliving their own trauma

from these events) or that syllabi and classes be marked with “trigger warnings” so

The coverage of rape law in criminal law was itself a huge controversy in the
early days of legal feminism, see e.g. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The
Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of Law (Cambridge: Mass. Harvard University
Press, 2000); Sanford Kadish, Stephen J. Schulhofer and Rachel Barkow, Criminal
Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials (10th ed. New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2016).
174 Katie Roiphe, The Morning After: Sex Fear and Feminism (Hamish Hamilton,
1993) .
175 My own law school now has more “Critical Identity” ad “Critical Race” courses
and seminars than “separate” gender or feminist courses.
176 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes
in the Economics, Diversification and Organization of Lawyering," (1994) 44 Case
Western Reserve University L. Rev. 621; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "The Feminization of
the Legal Profession: The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers" in Lawyers in
Society: Vol. 3 Comparative Theories (R. Abel & P. Lewis, eds) (Univ. of Cal. Press,
Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1989) , Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “Exploring A Research
Agenda of the Feminization of the Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and Social
Change," (1989) 14 Law & Social Inquiry 289-319; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "The
Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers" (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall L. J. 897.
173
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students will know in advance (and can sometimes opt-out of class, for “safe
spaces”) that these subjects will be covered. 177

Treatment of women’s or feminist issues can now be found in several places

in the legal academy—a few specialized courses remain, some taught as the study of
a “historical” movement within the context of other jurisprudential schools, 178 as
assimilated into the conventional curriculum (discrimination in Constitutional,

employment and family law), domestic violence, prostitution or “sex work” and rape
in torts or criminal law, reproductive rights in health law, constitutional law, torts
and contracts (e.g., surrogacy and adoption contracts) and as parts of larger

advanced and elective courses (intellectual property, gender difference in dispute
resolution 179 immigration law, human and civil rights). In a few schools with

empirical or socio-legal research agendas new generations of scholars pursue

important empirical projects on how gender is experienced, policed and regulated
in a variety of legal settings. 180 Like earlier generations, many here are looking at

the role of the “rule of law” and the State and its institutions more generally as both
The “trigger warning” controversy in United States higher education has erupted
on many campuses with great disagreements about freedom of speech, educational
values and protection or some (including me) arguing that this is “overprotection”
of students, The controversy has divided feminists on many campuses. See e.g. Greg
Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt, “The Coddling of the American Mind” The Atlantic,
September 2015; Jeannie Suk, ‘Shutting Down Conversation about Rape at Harvard
Law, (2015) New Yorker, Dec. 11, 2015; Mick Hume, Trigger Warnings: Is the Fear
of Being Offensive Killing Free Speech, (London: William Collins, 2015).
178 Stephen Gottlieb, Brian Bix, Timothy Lytton and Robin West, Jurisprudence Cases
and Materials: An Introduction to Philosophy of Law and Its Applications (Lexis-Nexis,
2006).
179 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Women in Dispute Resolution: Parties, Lawyers and
Dispute Resolvers – What Difference Does ‘Gender Difference’ Make? (2012)
Dispute Resolution Magazine (ABA April 2012).
180Laura Beth Nielsen and Robert L. Nelson, eds., Handbook of Employment
Discrimination Research: Rights and Realities, (Springer, 2005); Gustafson , Ibid.,
(welfare and poverty) ; Aya Gruber and Amy Cohen, ibid., Dorothy Roberts,
Shattered Bonds: The Color of Child Welfare (Civitas, 2002); Rachel Kahn Best et. al.,
‘Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO
Litigation,’ (2011) 45 Law & Society Review 991; Lynette Chua, Mobilizing Gay
Rights in Singapore: Rights and Resistance in an Authoritarian State (Philadelphia,
Pa: Temple University Press, 2015).
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facilitating and claiming to promote equality, and also hindering substantive justice

with rigid categories, disparate enforcement, benefits, punishments and treatments,
and through co-opted reinterpretations of advocacy categories, when controlled by
the state or disputed by different political interpretations. 181

And, as many queer, post-modern and critical race theorists deconstruct (and

reconstruct) more complex identities in the law, many scholars have come to

question what they call the artificial “binary” of either biological sex or sociological

“gender.” 182 Thus, feminist theory, teaching and advocacy has “deconstructed” into

more complex, less essential, categories and more “context specific” or
particularized subjects of study.

At the same time a few in the older generations continue to pursue theories

and issues that build on earlier conceptualizations, such as continuing gender

(essentialist?) specific projects, such as the important efforts to have rape formally
recognized as an international war crime, the role of women in transitional justice

and peace seeking activities, and the recognition of women’s rights as international
human rights. 183 Throughout the decades Professor Martha Fineman has held

yearly scholarly conferences (and published books almost annually) to study gender
issues but to broaden, deepen and “universalize” feminist interests into concerns

See Catherine Mackinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard
Press, 1987); Amy J. Cohen, ‘Trauma and the Welfare State,’ (2017) Texas Law
Review; Gustafson, Ibid, Serena Mayeri, Reasoning From Race: Feminism, Law and
the Civil Rights Revolution (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011); Id,
“Historicizing the ‘End of Men”.: The Politics of Reaction(s)’ (2013) 93 Boston
University Law Review 729.
182 Butler, Fineman, and Halley Ibid. See bibliography: Empirical Methods and
Critical race Theory, Center on Law, Equality and Race, University of California,
Irvine, at http://law.uci.edu/academics/centers/clear/research.html.
183 Catherine Mackinnon, Are Women Human? And other international Dialogues
(Harvard-Belknap Press, 2007); See Rome Treaty (Statute of International Criminal
Court), Art. 7 (1) (g) Crimes Against Humanity, including “rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of
sexual violence of comparable gravity,” (in force, July 1, 2002); see also Rhonda
Copelon,’ GENDER CRIMES AS WAR CRIMES: INTEGRATING CRIMES AGAINST
WOMEN INTO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, McGill Law Review (2000).
181
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about subordination and vulnerability more generally, with emphases on children,

abused people, gay, lesbian and transgender individuals, migrants, sex workers and
other victims of oppression or discriminatory activity.

Whether we now inhabit a “post-feminist” world in which women legal

academics now teach with a great variety of teaching methods, and pursue research
and study of law reform in virtually every area of human endeavor, with an

increasingly diverse student body, as well as the law professoriate, is one, perhaps
overly “optimistic,” conclusion to be reached from the American experience. In my

own view, the influx of women legal academics in the 1980s to the present remains
significant not only for the demographic diversification of the professoriate, but
more importantly, for the intellectual contributions of a variety of contested

conceptualizations of how gender and law structure, constitute, and regulate all
human activity. I still think that gender matters (whether from oppressive

discrimination and stereotyping, or more socially constructed “differences”) and

that different ideas about how gender matters in law will continue to provoke and

inspire new legal “memes” (whether in formal doctrinal law, legal scholarship and
research or instruction).
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